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 Introduction 
The objectives of this paper are to examine the importance of crew resource 
management (CRM) principles in the safe operation of unmanned aircraft systems 
(UAS) commercial flight operations and to emphasize the practical application of 
CRM principles to UAS commercial operations. The perspective of this paper is 
commercial flight operations for high altitude, long endurance (HALE) large UAS 
as defined by Arjomandi (2007), and that the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) places in risk categories five to six (RC5 to RC6) as shown in Figure 1 
(Ryan & Larrow, 2017, p. 11)
 
Figure 1. Note. Risk Classes (RC) Based on Kinetic Energy. Adapted from “FAA 
Building Blocks Leading to UAS Integration, Airworthiness and Operational 
Integration,” by W. Ryan and J. Larrow, 2017, Russian FederalAir Transport 
Agency (FATA). 
 
The current regulation governing UAS, 14 Code of Federal Regulations 
(CFR.) part 107, Small Unmanned Aircraft Operations, applies only to “the 
registration, airmen certification, and operation of civil unmanned aircraft systems 
within the United States” (Federal Aviation Administration, 2018a, para. 107.1). 
This regulation does not apply to air carrier operations (i.e., operations for hire), 
aircraft subject to the provisions of 14 CFR part 101(i.e., Moored Balloons, Kites, 
Amateur Rockets, Umanned Free Ballons, and Certain Model Aircraft), or remote 
1
Neff: CRM for Large UAS Operations
Published by Scholarly Commons, 2019
 pilot operations subject to the provisions of section 333 of public law 112-95 
(United States Congress, 2012). 
The orderly integration of UAS into the national airspace system (NAS) is 
a high priority of the congress and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
(Trump, 2018). The FAA formed the UAS Integration Pilot Program with the 
purpose of coalescing local, state, and federal government entities with private 
sector organizations to assist the Department of Transportation and the FAA to 
write regulations allowing the use of more complex UAS in joint use airspace 
(Federal Aviation Administration, 2018b). The program is charged with reviewing 
the following topics: 
The IPP Lead Participants are evaluating a host of operational concepts, 
including night operations, flights over people and beyond the pilot's line 
of sight, package delivery, detect-and-avoid technologies and the 
reliability and security of data links between pilot and aircraft. Fields that 
could see immediate opportunities from the program include commerce, 
photography, emergency management, agricultural support and 
infrastructure inspections. (Federal Aviation Administration, 2018b, para. 
3) 
A successful program and promulgation of regulations applicable to the 
commercial operation of HALE UAS in RC5 to RC6 would eliminate the need for 
each operator to seek an exemption under section 333 of public law 112-95 (United 
States Congress, 2012). 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) provided 
further imputus for the development of an industry, academic, and governmental 
partnership to promulgate regulatory protocols on June 13, 2018. NASA remotely 
piloted Ikhana, a civilian version of a MQ-9 Predator B UAS, without a chase plane 
in NAS Class A and Class E airspace to demonstrate joint use compatibility with a 
mix of manned aircraft traffic (Kooser, 2018; Northon, 2018). “Ikhana is a Native 
American Choctaw word meaning intelligent, conscious or aware” (Conner, 2015, 
para. 2). If long-range passenger and cargo transportation are added to the spectrum 
of large commercial UAS operations, the need for risk mitigation increases 
exponentially. It is critical that our academic, industrial, and regulatory sectors 
develop public policy to support their use to contribute to social, economic, and 
environmental well-being. The collaborative development and implementation of 
regulations covering HALE RC5 to RC6 UAS operations is a critical task of the 
UAS Integration Pilot Program because these types of large commercial UAS flight 
operations are on the horizon, and UAS will effect numerous social and economic 
changes in the near future. 
According to Uzialko (2018), commercial UAS are currently used or 
forecast for future use in the areas listed in Table 1. 
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 Table 1 
 
Commercial Uses for UAS 
 
Area Application 
Agriculture and 
Forrest Management 
Crop management, Pest Infestation, 
Vegitation management 
Architecture and 
Construction 
3D representations of intended structures 
Engineering Site Survey 
Enviornmental 
Monitoring and 
Conservation 
Monitor land and ocean wildlife migration 
patterns, monitor water resources for 
availability and for flood potential, and 
monitor reclusive species  
Media and Insurance Aerial footage of disaster areas 
Internet Access Less expensive alternative to satellites 
Note. Commercial UAS currently used or forecast for future use. Adapted from 
“10 Cool Commercial Drone Uses Coming to a Sky Near You, ‘ by A. C. 
Uzialko, 2018, Business News Daily. Retreived from 
https://www.businessnewsdaily.com 
 
Although the current regulations do not provide for large civil commercial UAS 
operations, the flight of Ikhana demonstrated what is possible in the future of 
remotely piloted, large, commercial UAS. In addition to the commercial uses listed 
in Table 1, NASA researchers have forecasted their use in forest fire monitoring, 
emergency services, natural disaster monitoring, search and rescue operations, and 
large metropolitan traffic monitoring, in addition to law enforcement functions 
(Northon, 2018). Conceptualize the environmental impact of providing citizens 
with efficient traffic routing during rush hour or the monitoring of forest fire 
potential or water usage to ensure efficient crop hydration. A common thread in 
their utility is that they are used over large population centers or areas where there 
will be other air traffic congestion. 
As can be seen from Figure 2, the MQ-9 is classified between RC5 and RC6 
with a probability of catastrophic failure of x10-8. This aircraft certification risk  
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Figure 2. Fixed Wing and Rotorcraft Probability of Catastrophic Failure vs. 
Kinetic Energy. Adapted from “Unmanned Systems Certification” by W. Ryan, 
2017, Committee on Assessing the Risks of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) 
Integration. Retrieved from http://sites.nationalacademies.org/DEPS/ 
ASEB/DEPS_180887 
 
calculation is determined through consideration of the operator’ concept of 
operation as well as the airspace and area of operation proposed (Ryan & Larrow, 
2017). Human factors influence every aspect of the risk determination of UAS 
operations. Humans design, manufacture, test, maintain, and program the vehicle 
for autonomous flight or remotely pilot the vehicle for the assigned mission. There 
are numerous elements to be considered in order to reduce the risk of human error 
in every phase of the design, build, operate process to include training, mentoring, 
and quality control. In fixed and rotary wing flight operations, CRM has proven to 
be an instrumental element in the reduction of accidents as demonstrated by the 
decreasing slope of the curve from 1998 to 2013 shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. The Transformation of CRM-based Training and it [sic] Effects on 
Aviation Safety in the U.S. from 1960 to 2013. Adapted from “The 
Transformation of CRM-Based Training and it[sic] Effects on Aviation Safety in 
the U.S. from 1960 to 2013,” by L. Rudaei et al., 2015. Retrieved from 
https://flight Safety.org 
 
To date, the FAA has followed a gradual development of the regulatory 
structure governing the operation of UAS. The FAA should be more proactive in 
developing the regulatory structure due to the rapid development of new and 
innovative technologies in the field as demonstrated by the remotely piloted, 
unescorted flight of Ikhana in congested airspace over Southern California. 
Although human factors touch every aspect of the UAS, this research was confined 
to operational human factors errors through a case study of four MQ-9 accidents 
and a subsequent cross-case analysis. The cross-case analysis identified the eight 
most prevalent human factors errors in the four-accident data set. The errors 
identified were a mixture of soft-skill and hard-skill errors. Additionally, a review 
of a study completed by Sharma and Chakravarti (2005) reinforced the results of 
the cross-case analysis and added supplementary soft-skill human factors errors. 
The training and implementation of CRM principles into an overall safety 
management system to mitigate human factors errors in large UAS in the RC5 to 
RC6 categories will result in a reduction of the operational risk in the same manner 
as in fixed and rotary wing flight operations. 
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 Literature Review 
 
Four-Case Cross-Case Analysis Significant Human Factors Errors 
 
Neff (2016) completed a cross-case study of four large RC5 to RC6 UAS 
(i.e., MQ-9) accidents using the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System 
(HFACS) template developed by Wiegman and Shappell (2003) as the theoretical 
framework for the analysis. HFACS is inclusive of organizational culture, hard 
flying skills, and soft-skills such as communication and decision making. The 
cross-case HFACS analysis of the four accidents yielded 17 risk factors. A Pareto 
Analysis of the 17 risk factors yielded the eight highest risk (i.e., most prevalent) 
human factors errors indicated in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 
 
Four-Case Cross-Case Analysis Significant Human Factors Errors 
 
 
 
Note. This table is a compilation of the data presented in the analysis of each 
accident in the four-accident data set. Adapted from “Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems: The Mitigation of Human Factors Errors Through Training,” by P. Neff, 
2016. Retrieved from ProQuest Dissertations Publishing. 
 
These eight human factors account for 77% of the reviewed four-case UAS 
accident set. Neff (2016) selected the four-case UAS accident set because all the 
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 aircraft were MQ-9 Predator B aircraft. Coincidentally, Ikhana is the civilian 
version of the MQ-9. Three of the accident aircraft were flown by civilian 
commercial pilots under contract to a federal government organization while one 
accident aircraft was flown by a U.S. Air Force pilot. Current federal regulations 
do not provide for civilian commercial UAS of this size operated in the U.S. NAS. 
However, the time when the operation of this size or larger UAS will be routine in 
joint use airspace in the NAS is close at hand. In order to ensure the safety of all 
operators in the NAS, CRM should be part of an overall safety management system 
implemented and practiced by all operators and overseen by the FAA. 
 
Risk Calculation 
 
The tables were constructed using a frequency (f) and severity (S) multiplier 
to weight the prevalence of the various human errors. A scale of 1 to 5, extremely 
improbable to frequent, ranked frequency (f). Similarly, a scale of 1 to 5, negligible 
to catastrophic, ranked severity (S). For the purpose of representing relative risk, a 
maximum frequency of 5 and maximum severity of 5 were selected to derive a 
maximum risk factor of 25. A compilation of all risk factors in the four-accident 
data set identified 17 human factors errors yielding a total risk factor of 421 (Neff, 
2016). The risk calculation to determine the eight most prevalent human errors was 
based on the total of the 17 identified errors. Referencing Table 2, skill-based error 
scored a risk factor of  77 based on the total risk factor for skill-based errors of all 
four accidents. Seventy seven divided by 421 yields a risk percentage of 18% 
indicating that there is an 18% chance that skill-based errors were contributory to 
the accident. The Pareto Analysis determined the eight most prevalent errors listed 
in Table 2 and that skill-based errors were the leading causal factor in the four-
accident data set studied by Neff (2016). 
 
Indian Air Force Five-Case Accident Analysis 
 
A second study reviewed by Neff (2016) and completed by Sharma and 
Chakravarti (2005) analyzed five Indian Air Force UAS accidents. The results of 
their study identified eight themes relating to the causal role of the misapplication 
of soft skills in the accidents and are presented in Table 3. Their analysis placed 
emphasis on the inputs of communication and workload management to teamwork 
and on the output of teamwork consisting of situational awareness. Although 
Sharma and Chakravarti (2005) did not mention threat and error management 
specifically, they included leadership and decision making in their analysis as 
causal soft skills; both of which are foundations of threat and error management. 
The research conducted by Sharma and Chakravarti (2005) confirms several of the 
eight human factors errors listed in Table 2 determined by Neff (2016), and it 
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 identifies other primarily soft skill human factors errors not present in the Neff 
study. 
As can be seen from Table 2, Neff’s (2016) four-aircraft accident case study 
lists communications and coordination errors as the fourth most significant error 
contributing an overall 8.6% risk as an accident causal factor. Sharma and 
Chakravarti’s (2005) five-accident case study represented in Table 3 placed 
communication as the seventh greatest risk factor. 
 
Table 3 
 
India DGAC Case Study Derived Human Factors Errors (Sharma & Chakravarti, 
2005) 
 
 
 
Note. Adapted from “Unmanned Aircraft Systems: The Mitigation of Human 
Factors Errors Through Training,” by P. Neff, 2016. Retrieved from ProQuest 
Dissertations Publishing. 
 
Importance of CRM to Safety in Commercial Manned or Unmanned Flight 
Operations 
As cited by Neff (2016), Lacagnina, Rosenkrans, Werfelman, and Darby 
(2003) identified four mitigations: (a) crew resource management, (b) standard 
operating procedures, (c) professional culture, and (d) safety regulation applied by 
operators to improve safety in the airline cockpit. CRM was developed in the 1970s 
in response to research data that indicated the majority of airline accidents were 
caused by human error versus mechanical failure. These mitigations apply equally 
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 to large commercial UAS flight operations. They emphasized the importance of 
crew resource management as foundational to safe flight operations. 
 
Concepts of CRM for Future UAS Operations 
 
CRM embodies the concept of efficiently managing all of the available 
resources (Federal Aviation Administration, 2004). Technical flying skills 
constitute one of the elements foundational to safe flight operations. The tenets of 
CRM focus on the effective use of soft skills such as interpersonal communication, 
decision-making, leadership, problem solving, threat and error management, task 
allocation, and maintaining situational awareness (SKYbrary, 2018). All of these 
skills are human skills which if not learned and practiced might become human 
errors. CRM is one of the elements of a safety program that encourages effective 
collaborative thought and mitigates the deleterious effects of human errors, 
incorrect human responses to threats, such as poor communication, multi-tasking, 
loss of orientation, and failure to recognize potential threats to safe flight 
operations. 
Based on a review of the CRM course descriptions of three major 
universities with large aviation programs, communications, workload management, 
and situational awareness constitute the subject areas emphasized during the 
course. Additionally, Dahlstrom, Laursen, and Bergstrom (2008) described the 
relationship of threat and error management and CRM when they stated “The 
concept has been described in many different ways, including it being a new 
generation of CRM or even an alternative to CRM” (p. 20). This research included 
threat and error management (TEM) in the CRM model represented in Figure 4 
based on the premise that “…the overarching justification for CRM should be error 
management” (Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm, 1999, p. 27). Cusick, Cortes, and 
Rodrigues (2017) reinforced the inclusion of TEM in the CRM framework when 
they noted “…the sixth generation of CRM was formed, which introduced the 
Threat and Error Management (TEM) framework as a formalized approach for 
identifying sources of threats and preventing them from impacting safety at the 
earliest possible time” (p.131). 
To codify the concepts, a visual representation of the CRM framework 
represented in Figure 4 identifies communication and workload management as 
inputs to the collaborative thought process of teamwork while situational awareness 
and threat and error management constitute the outputs. 
9
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Figure 4. Visual representation of the CRM model framework. 
 
The elements of communications, workload management, situational 
awareness, threat and error management, and teamwork represent a transition that 
occurs when individual soft skills are utilized to aggregate a team approach to 
achieve safe flight operations. The FAA considers the acquisition of CRM skills to 
be “…an integral part of training and [flight] operations” (Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2004, Purpose section, para. 1). Although the FAA considers CRM 
skills to be a critical element in safe flight operations, the administration does not 
specifically address CRM in the area of UAS flight operations. The purpose of this 
paper is to explore the applicability of CRM principles as operational tenets to 
multi-crew commercial UAS flight operations for integration into a safety 
management system in order to achieve a high level of safety. 
 
Methodology 
 
The study overlaid the accident causal factors determined by Neff (2016) 
represented in Table 2 and the accident causal factors determined by Sharma and 
Chakravarti (2005) shown in Table 3 against the CRM subject map represented in 
Figure 4. The result was an identification of the CRM elements with their associated 
potential accident causal risks that were not applied. If the CRM elements had been 
applied, the human errors might have been mitigated and the accident might not 
have occurred. 
 
Human Factors Errors in Large UAS Flight Operations 
 
Nogales, AZ April 26, 2006. The U.S. Border Patrol loss of an MQ-9 at 
Nogales, AZ on April 26, 2006, was the first UAS accident investigated by the 
NTSB (National Transportation Safety Board, 2007). The accident aircraft was 
flown by a civilian commercial pilot under contract to the Border Patrol. The NTSB 
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 cited inadequate training, inadequate supervision, normalization of deviation, and 
workload management as contributing causes (National Transportation Safety 
Board, 2007). An analysis using the HFACS template identified 13 separate human 
factors causal factors. A Pareto analysis yielded the eight factors shown in Table 4 
that accounted for 82% of the causal factor risk (Neff, 2016). 
 
Table 4 
 
Risk Factor Calculation U.S. Border Patrol Accident April 26, 2006, Nogales, AZ 
 
Note. As an example, the organizational climate risk factor of 20 used a frequency 
“f” of 4.0 and a severity “S” of  5 (i.e., 4.0 x 5 = 20). Adapted from “Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems: The Mitigation of Human Factors Errors Through Training,” 
by P. Neff, 2016. Retrieved from ProQuest Dissertations Publishing. 
 
Seychelles Islands, December 13, 2011. The U.S. Air Force MQ-9A 
accident aircraft was flown under contract to the U.S. Air Force by a civil 
commercial pilot. The aircraft suffered an engine malfunction shortly after takeoff. 
The pilot elected to execute a return to the departure airport. The subsequent high 
speed approach and landing resulted in a runway overrun and the destruction of the 
aircraft. The U.S. Air Force Accident Investigation Board (USAFAIB) cited several 
probable causes including pilot proficiency and decision making (Jaquish, 2011). 
An HFACS analysis of the accident yielded 11 contributing human factors with the 
seven significant human factors shown in Table 5. A Pareto analysis resulted in the 
seven significant human factors errors noted in Table 5 accounted for 78% of the 
risk (Neff, 2016). 
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 Table 5 
 
Risk Factor Calculations USAF Accident December 13, 2011, Seychelles Islands 
 
Note. Adapted from “Unmanned Aircraft Systems: The Mitigation of Human 
Factors Errors Through Training,” by P. Neff, 2016. Retrieved from ProQuest 
Dissertations Publishing. 
 
Seychelles Islands, April 4, 2012. The U.S. Air Force MQ-9A aircraft 
crashed in the Seychelles Islands in April 2012, four months following the crash in 
the Seychelles of a another MQ-9A. This aircraft was also flown by a civilian 
commercial pilot. The pilot accidently shut the engine down after takeoff and was 
forced to attempt an on-airport landing without engine power. The pilot did not 
complete proper checklists, follow standard operating procedures, and failed to 
configure the aircraft for landing. After a landing gear up arrival, the aircraft left 
the runway and came to rest in the Indian Ocean 4 minutes and 15 seconds after 
takeoff (Echternacht, 2012). The USAFAIB again cited a lack of proficiency as a 
contributing cause (Echternacht, 2012). An HFACS analysis of the accident 
identified 14 potential human factors errors that contributed to the accident while 
the nine human factors errors shown in Table 6, based on a Pareto analysis, 
accounted for 80% of the contributory accident risk (Neff, 2016). 
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 Table 6 
 
Risk Factor Calculations USAF Accident April 4, 2012, Seychelles Islands 
 
Note. Adapted from “Unmanned Aircraft Systems: The Mitigation of Human 
Factors Errors Through Training,” by P. Neff, 2016. Retrieved from ProQuest 
Dissertations Publishing. 
 
Douglas County, NV, December 5, 2012. The mishap aircraft, an MQ-9 
Reaper, was piloted by a U.S. Air Force pilot on a training mission in the vicinty of 
Las Vegas, NV. The USAFAIB found that some of the cockpit controls were not 
properly set during the preflight inspection. This anomoly was attributed to the fact 
that the mission crew did not perform the preflight inspection instead they relied on 
another crew to complete the preflight checklist. This practice was noted as 
common among the crews and violated standard operating procedures constituting 
a normalization of deviation. As a result of this practice on this flight, the aircraft 
propeller went into reverse pitch every time the throttle was selected to a position 
outside of full thrust. The aircraft stalled and impacted the ground resulting in a 
total loss (Grace, 2012). An HFACS analysis of the accident indicated 12 human 
factors accident risks to include inadequate supervision, pilot skill-based errors, 
poor decision making, and inadequate crew workload management (Neff, 2016). A 
Pareto analysis yielded the seven risks listed in Table 7 representing 78% of the 
total risk factors. 
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 Table 7 
 
Risk Factor Calculations USAF Accident December 5, 2012, Douglas County, 
Nevada 
 
 
Note. Adapted from “Unmanned Aircraft Systems: The Mitigation of Human 
Factors Errors Through Training,” by P. Neff, 2016. Retrieved from ProQuest 
Dissertations Publishing. 
 
 
CRM Elements 
Communication 
 
Communication and coordination issues were the second most prevalent 
risk factor that contributed to the April 4, 2012, Seychelles Islands accident a risk 
factor of 20 as indicated in Table 7. Additionally, communications and coordination 
was the fifth most prevalent risk factor in the USAF Douglas County, NV MQ-9 
accident. As presented in the Table 2 cross-case analysis (Neff, 2016) and Sharma 
and Chakravarti’s (2005) five-accident analysis in shown in Table 3, 
communications issues were the fourth and seventh, respectively, leading causal 
factors in the accidents studied. Practiced CRM skills might have mitigated the 
communications causal factors. 
As an underlying element of CRM and an input to teamwork, good 
communication involves a speaker, a clear message, and a receiver. A common 
language consisting of standard terminology and expected standard operating 
procedures for a given set of circumstances reinforces the team concept. Use of 
“we” language when the pilot-in-command solicits input and informs other 
crewmembers and acknowledges all decisions gained through an open and 
interactive operating environment improves communication. Additionally, 
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 standard callouts serve as check-in communication during periods of high 
operational stress and low communication. 
The importance of clear communication between and among various crews 
operating a single UAS in the takeoff, landing, and mission phases is a critical 
element of mission success. Without the drag disadvantage of external stores, 
mission duration might approach 30 hours in a civil commercial tasking (Wheeler, 
2012). A duration of this length will require several crew changes at both crew 
positions (i.e., pilot and sensor operator) as well as personnel in the ground support 
cadre of up to 171 persons (Wheeler, 2012). 
 
Workload Management 
 
In Sharma and Chakravarti’s (2005) five-accident analysis in shown in 
Table 3, elements of workload presented in the study included critical 
thinking/decision making and task saturation based on pilot skills. Workload 
management ranked as the third most prevalent accident causal factor. Neff (2016) 
represented workload management through the basic elements of decision making 
and [pilot] skill-based errors. These combined errors were prevalent in each of the 
four accidents and represented 31% of the accident risk as indicated in Table 2. The 
proportion of accident risk strongly indicates the criticality of integrating workload 
management skills into a CRM training program for large commercial civil UAS 
operators through scenario based abnormal and emergency situations. These 
scenarios should precipitate task saturation representative of the causal factors 
present in each of the four cohort accidents. 
Time management is synchronous with successful task accomplishment. As 
with all tasks, concentration on the task at hand while reducing distractions and 
being open to ideas and opinions from other team members assists in the 
distribution of the workload. 
Critical to workload management is the use of standard operating 
procedures (SOP). SOP embody the element of risk analysis and represent the least 
risk option appropriate for the circumstance. As such, reliance on SOP reduces the 
workload and establishes a natural task prioritization. A CRM program 
emphasizing proactive workload management prevents task saturation and 
facilitates effective, as well as efficient, team member completion of assigned tasks. 
 
Teamwork 
 
McEwan, Ruissen, Eys, Zumbo, and Beauchamp (2017) provided a very 
comprehensive definition of teamwork that embodies the concepts of  “ 
…interactive and interdependent behavioral processes among team members” (p. 
2). In the CRM model framework, the interdependent and interactive processes 
15
Neff: CRM for Large UAS Operations
Published by Scholarly Commons, 2019
 include communication and workload management inputs. McEwan et al. (2017) 
further characterized outputs such as team performance to be the result of 
teamwork. The authors cite the collaborative working environment prevalent in a 
crew working through a technical issue or a weather problem as an example of 
aviation teamwork. 
In the aviation CRM model framework, foundational teamwork skills 
include clear, concise briefings that establish individual tasks and performance 
expectations as well as operational limits. Additionally, the concepts of teamwork 
emphasize mutual respect for the input of each crewmember demonstrated by the 
practice of using inclusive language such as the term “we.” 
Further, an important aspect of teamwork emphasized in the model is the 
debriefing of individual or team performance. Performance outputs consist of team 
situational awareness and team threat and error management. These concepts 
should be fundemental in UAS flight operations because flight crews often consist 
of a takeoff and landing crew and multiple enroute crews. In these critical phases 
of flight, situational awareness and threat and error management outputs of 
teamwork assume a high degree of importance due to the aircraft proximity to the 
ground and to the transitioning configurations. The reverse is true of the recovery 
phase of the aircraft. Some aircraft will be able to stay airborne for extended periods 
of time in the enroute phase over population centers providing essential services for 
extended periods of time. This mission will require multiple crews to fly the aircraft 
over the duration of the mission. 
Anticipated operational protocols will likely require several teams to 
operate the UAS. Sharma and Chakravarti (2005) specifically identified teamwork 
as an evaluated element in their five-UAS accident study as the fifth contributing 
factor to the cohort of accidents studied. Neff (2016) dissected teamwork into 
components including decision errors, communication and coordination, failure to 
correct known problems, routine violations (i.e., normalization of deviation), and 
inadequate supervision. A combined accident causal risk factor of 39.5% of these 
elements of teamwork derived from Table 2 point to the importance of teaching 
effective teamwork skills as an element of a safety management system 
implemented by large commercial civil UAS operators. 
 
Situational Awareness 
 
Situational awareness is also frequently characterized as a common mental 
model. In aviation terms, this means that the flight crew shares a common 
perception of the current and future flight environment and trajectory of the aircraft. 
Situational awareness is enhanced through pertinent and timely briefings using 
common language to ensure understanding of the current and future operating 
environment and to maintain an open and interactive operating atmosphere. The 
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 open and interactive operating environment encourages crewmember advocacy and 
the validation of the common mental model. 
Continued situational awareness is foundational to safe UAS flight 
operations. According to Merlin (2013), “[Remotely Piloted Aircraft] RPA 
operators are subject to impaired situational awareness as a  result of several 
factors” (p.127). The situational awareness challenges to UAS pilots include flying 
the RPA through the use of cameras. The cameras provide a restricted view of the 
flight environment compounded by the limiting capabilities of the data link 
bandwidth that “can reduce the RPA operator’s temporal resolution, spatial 
resolution, and color discrimination capabilities” (Merlin, 2013, p. 127). 
Frequently, highly experienced fixed-wing pilots (to include this author) 
with several thousand flight hours accumulated in various types of aircraft flown in 
numerous flight envioronments become task saturated very rapidly when initially 
flying a MQ-1 or MQ-9 UAS. Experience flying the RPA via camera without the 
usual weather cues, the delayed control response, the lack of tactile feel, and the 
lack of peripheral vision reinforced the  importance of CRM and the coordination 
required with the camera operator to successfully fly the RPA. The need for CRM 
and teamwork in UAS flight operations was critical. Merlin (2013) emphatically 
stated that “Good training and teamwork are critical to the safe operation of 
remotely piloted vehicles” (p. 130). 
Sharma and Chakravarti (2005) listed loss of situational awareness as the 
second most prevalent accident risk factor in their five-accident review. As noted 
in Table 3, UAS pilots’ duty periods are long and consist of monitoring the flight 
trajectory performance of the highly automated vehicle. Sharma and Chakravarti 
(2005) found that pilots lost concentration resulting in diminished situational 
awareness. Given the technological environment created by highly automated 
systems, CRM crew training focused on human in-the-loop protocols will be a 
foundational element to teach crews the importance of maintaining situational 
awareness during large civil commercial UAS operations. 
 
Threat and Error Management 
 
Threat and Error Management (TEM) in flight operations is comprised of 
three elements: threats, errors, and undesired aircraft state (SKYbrary, 2017). The 
basic premise of TEM is that flight crews will manage threats and commit errors as 
part of normal flight operations. The mismanagement of the threats and errors might 
precipitate an undesired aircraft state. As a consequence, recognizing threats and 
acting appropriately to trap errors prior to attaining an undesired aircraft state is 
critical to safe flight operations for all operations to include UAS flight operations. 
Threat. A threat is “an event or error that occurs beyond the influence of 
the flight crew, increases operational complexity, and which must be managed to 
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 maintain the margins of safety” (SKYbrary, 2017, para. 2.0). It usually constitutes 
the first step in the sequence, which if not properly managed, leads to an operational 
error and a potential subsequent undesired aircraft state. Anticipated threats are 
threats posed by known hazards such as adverse weather or traffic congestion for 
manned aircraft. Unmanned aircraft threats might consist of weather events that 
exceed the certification limitations of the aircraft. Unexpected threats occur due to 
in-flight malfunctions that require flight crew skill and knowledge to achieve a 
solution. In unmanned aircraft operations, lost communications link or loss of 
visual contact constitute unexpected threats. A third type of threat is the latent 
threat. These types of threats potentially stem from design deficiencies or 
inadequate operational policy planning. Identifying and managing threats is a 
building block for error management and prevention of the aircraft attaining an 
undesired aircraft state (SKYbrary, 2017). 
In each accident of Neff’s (2016) cross-case analysis, a misidentified and 
inappropriately managed threat resulted in an error that was not corrected and 
precipitated the undesired aircraft state and loss of the RPA. In the April 26, 2006 
Nogales, AZ accident, the threat of a loss of the flight display for the untrained and 
unsupervised pilot created errors in decision making and procedural execution that 
eventually led to the crash. 
Error. In the context of TEM, errors are defined as “actions or inactions by 
the flight crew that lead to deviations from organisational [sic] or flight crew 
intentions or expectations” (SKYbrary, 2017, para. 3). Errors are the next step in 
the sequence occurring as a result of a mismanaged threat. The concept of error 
trapping (i.e., detection and response) is as critical as the concept of understanding 
error cause and perpetuation (SKYbrary, 2017). 
There are three types of errors (a) aircraft handling errors, (b) procedural 
errors, and (c) communications errors. Aircraft handling errors occur when the 
flight crew mishandles the aircraft in some manner such as exceeding aircraft 
design limitations, selecting an incorrect automation state, or being unable to fly 
the aircraft within the operational parameters. With reference to Table 2, Neff’s 
(2016) four-accident case study found that 18% of the accident risk can be ascribed 
to skill-based errors in aircraft handling. 
Procedural errors occur with flight crew failure to properly follow standard 
operating procedures, failure to use such aids as checklists, briefings, and callouts 
(SKYbrary, 2017). Events of the Seychelles Islands, April 4, 2012 accident 
highlight the lack of procedural discipline when the mission pilot shut down the 
engine inadvertantly, both crewmembers failed to complete the landing procedures, 
and landed the aircraft with the landing gear retracted. 
Communication errors occur when the flight crew misunderstands or 
misapplies an external instruction or when the flight crew misinterprets internal 
communication between themselves (SKYbrary, 2017). As referenced in Table 2, 
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 Neff’s (2016) four-accident cohort study ranked communications errors high with 
a 8% probability that they were a causal factor. Sharma and Chakravarti (2005) 
ranked communications as the seventh leading accident risk factor in their 5-
accident study. 
Undesired Aircraft State. The TEM context defines undesired aircraft 
state as “flight induced aircraft position or speed deviations, misapplication of flight 
controls, or incorrect systems configuration, associated with a reduction in margins 
of safety” (SKYbrary, 2017, para. 4). Undesired aircraft state often is the result of 
a misidentification of a threat with the resultant error in flight crew management of 
the threat. 
Undesired aircraft states fall into three categories. The first category 
consists of aircraft handling errors such as loss of aircraft control, operation of the 
aircraft outside of the design envelope, and unstable approaches. The second 
category involves flight crew ground navigation errors such as following an 
incorrect taxi route or taxiing to an incorrect spot or gate. The third undesired 
aircraft state is the result of the flight crew misconfiguring the aircraft for the 
intended operation (SKYbrary, 2017). A landing gear up landing or a takeoff with 
an incorrect weight and balance configuration are examples of misconfigured 
aircraft. 
The tenets of CRM encompass several countermeasures to ensure that 
threats are recognized, errors are trapped before they occur, and the undesired 
aircraft state is not attained. As a priority, operators must train and emphasize the 
application of standard operating procedures (SOP) by flight crews. SOP are 
developed from best practices learned over time and represent the best risk 
mitigations for potential threats. According to SKYbrary (2017), 70% of flight crew 
activity is devoted to TEM countermeasures. In addition to the application of SOP, 
cross-checking of crew actions by other crewmembers, re-evaluating decisions, 
encouraging questions, establishing protocols for conflict resolution, encouraging 
crewmember advocacy, and using standard callouts constitute TEM mitigations. 
The planning, execution, and review of TEM countermeasures (SKYbrary, 
2017) are required flight crew skills. Flight operational safety is the result of a high 
functioning flight crew team utilizing the tenets of CRM in a systemic based 
operational tempo relying on SOP, excellent communications skills, crew workload 
management, maintenance of situational awareness, and timely application of TEM 
countermeasures. 
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 Conclusions and Future Research 
 
Conclusions 
 
The overall purpose of this article was to research CRM operational tenets 
for integration into a safety management system construct for future large civil 
commercial UAS operations that when applied as standard operating procedures 
will contribute to operational safety in the joint use NAS. Both Neff’s (2016) four-
accident case study and Sharma and Chakravarti’s (2005) five-accident study 
demonstrated that inadequate leadership skills at the corporate management level 
and skill-based errors at the operational level compounded the soft-skill errors of 
decision making, workload management, and communication. Additionally, Table 
2 and Table 3 indicate inadequate workload management and loss of situational 
awareness contributed to the nine accidents studied. In Figure 3, Rudari, et al. 
(2015) demonstrated that an operational philosophy emphasizing the principles of 
CRM in training supported the implementation of safety procedures and operational 
best practices in daily flight operations. The result was fewer operational accidents 
during the period 1998 to 2013. As an overarching operational philosophy, a vibrant 
safety management system incorporating CRM as one element countering human 
factors errors must be supported by the accountable executive and by senior 
leadership. 
 
Future Research 
 
The arena of future UAS commercial flight operations presents numerous research 
opportunities. Further fatigue management research will be driven by the 
prospective operating environment of long duration missions. Similarly, human-
machine interface attention span research to improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of automated systems management will be a requirement of future 
UAS flight operations. Research into the effectiveness and feasibility of 
promulgating risk-based regulation applicable to all operators by national aviation 
authorities will be required to ensure safe integration of UAS operations into the 
NAS. In addition to research in the operational area, studying the development of 
best CRM practices and the implementation of threat and error management 
principles inherent in CRM is necessary to counter potential human error in the 
design, manufacturing, operation, and maintenance of UAS. This future research 
will be necessary to meet the public’s demand and expectations of safety in the new 
unmanned sector of aviation. 
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